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The Effect of the Tiananmen Square
Massacre Upon Negotiations for the
Draft Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region
I. Introduction
It began in mid-May 1989 as a student hunger strike1 staged to
protest governmental corruption and nepotism, and to demand de-
mocratization; 2 it ended June 4 as soldiers of the People's Liberation
Army leveled AK-47's at a crowd of thousands and opened fire.3 The
place was Tiananmen Square, in the heart of Beijing.' The massacre
at Tiananmen Square, and the Chinese government's actions in the
weeks following the massacre, were watched closely in Hong Kong
which is scheduled to be reunified with China in 1997.1
This Comment will examine the effect of the massacre and the
Chinese government's subsequent actions upon the negotiation of
certain provisions of Hong Kong's future laws. Section II will ex-
amine the massacre, China's subsequent denial of any massacre, and
Hong Kong's reaction to those events. Section III will discuss Great
Britain's acquisition of Hong Kong, and the China-Britain agree-
ment regarding Hong Kong. Section IV will compare provisions for
the protection of human and individual rights contained within the
Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC Constitution),6
the China-Britain Joint Declaration,7 (Joint Declaration) and the
Draft Basic Law (DBL) 8 which has been proposed for Hong Kong.
1. Benjamin, State of Siege: With Tiananmen Square the Epicenter, a Political Quake
Convulses China, TIME, May 29, 1989, at 36.
2. Elson, China: Backed by the Army and Deng Xiaoping, Beijing's Hard-Liners Win
the Edge Over Moderates in a Closed-Door Struggle for Power, TIME, June 5, 1989, at 20.
3. Birnbaum & Chua-Eoan, Despair and Death in a Beijing Square, TIME, June 12,
1989, at 24 [hereinafter Birnbaum].
4. Id. This Comment's identification of Tiananmen Square as the place of the massacre
is meant to include all the deaths which occurred in Beijing as part of the uprising, whether
these occurred in the Square itself or in the city.
5. See Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question
of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, China-Great Britain, 1984 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2352 (Cmd. 20)
reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1336; 7 Lov. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 142 (1984) [hereinafter Joint
Declaration].
6. ZHONG HUA REN MIN GONG HE Guo XIAN FA (People's Republic of China Consti-
tution) [hereinafter PRC CONST.].
7. Joint Declaration, supra note 5.
8. THE DRAFT BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Proposed articles of the Draft Basic Law which are possible avenues
for the limitation of human and individual rights will also be
identified.
II. The Massacre at Tiananmen Square
The demonstrations began in Tiananmen Square, in the heart of
Beijing.9 The student protesters were joined by hundreds of
thousands of workers and sympathizers, paralyzing China's capital. 10
Ferment spread to at least a dozen other cities1" including Shanghai,
Guangzhou, Xian, and Chengdu. 2 On May 20, 1989, Premier Li
Peng and President Yang Shangkun imposed martial law, and troops
entered Beijing. 3 The protests diminished in size but did not cease,
and each time troops attempted to move into the city they were met
by groups of citizens who blocked the soldiers' path.14 The stalemate
lasted until June 4 when China's leadership ordered soldiers to re-
move the protesters from Tiananmen Square. 5 The military moved
into the Square, and thousands of students and workers were
massacred.1"
In the days following the massacre, it became apparent that
China's leadership was attempting to deny that any killings had
taken place.1 7 While observers reported that as many as 20,00018 cit-
izens were killed at Tiananmen Square, China's leadership claimed
that no more than 100 died.19 Chinese leaders also claimed that
army troops "were viciously attacked by rioters12 0 and denied that
soldiers fired directly at anyone.21 China's official account varied
sharply from reports given by survivors of the carnage.22
Foreign journalists also reported that China engaged in an ef-
fort to arrest and execute those who participated in the demonstra-
tions.2" Organizers of the demonstrations have been the targets of
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA for Solicitation of Opinions, reprinted in 20 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 301 (1988) [hereinafter DRAFT BASIC LAW].
9. Elson, supra note 2, at 20.
10. Id.
II. Benjamin, supra note I, at 40.
12. Talbott, Defiance, TIME, June 19, 1989, at 10.
13. Elson, supra note 2, at 20.
14. Id. at 23.
15. Birnbaum, supra note 3, at 24.
16. Id. For the purposes of this Comment, the term "Tiananmen Square" has ceased to
describe just a location; it has come to symbolize an event and will be used in that context.
17. Smolowe, Deng's Big Lie: The Hard-Liners Rewrite History to Justify Arrests and






23. Id. at 34.
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these manhunts.2 Pictures of student leaders of the demonstrations
have been broadcast on Chinese television,2 5 and the citizens of
China have been exhorted to turn in these "counter-
revolutionaries. 26
In Hong Kong, 7 the events in China did not go unnoticed.
Hong Kong, once a part of China, is currently a British Crown Col-
ony and is scheduled to be reunified with China in 1997.28 The popu-
lation of Hong Kong voiced strong support for the protesting citizens
in China.2" One million inhabitants of Hong Kong thronged the
streets of the Colony 30 to demonstrate in support of those protesting
in Tiananmen Square. The unity of a shared ethnic and cultural
background diminished any differences brought about by 147 years
of British rule. Hong Kong residents said: "[t]he people in
Tiananmen Square are my brothers and sisters. They have the same
blood as I do. I am Chinese."'3 1 "Blood has flowed like a river. A
catastrophe has befallen my country."3 After the May 20 declara-
tion of martial law in China, two Hong Kong negotiators walked out
of talks with China, 33 which were intended to develop Hong Kong's
future laws. Negotiations were suspended after the walk-out. 3' The
Hong Kong negotiators said that events in China had undermined
the confidence of the people of Hong Kong.35 Hong Kong's concern
can only be deepened by China's subsequent attempts to rewrite the
history of June 4. Television news reports, broadcast worldwide,
clearly showed soldiers firing upon the crowd," yet China denied
that the soldiers fired at anyone. 7 Hong Kong surely wondered at its
own future after reunification, and at the amount of faith it could
place in China's promises.
Ninety-eight percent of the population of Hong Kong is Chi-
nese.38 While Hong Kong has been perceived as apolitical and de-
voted to the business of business, 39 "since the student movement
blossomed in Beijing last April, Hong Kong has been galvanized. It
24. Amnesty International, Amnesty Action, 4, col. I (Sept./Oct. 1989).
25. Smolowe, supra note 17, at 32.
26. Id. at 33.
27. See infra Appendix i.
28. Joint Declaration, supra note 5.
29. Greenwald, Next Door and Eight Years Away: Hong Kong Demands Greater Free-
dom for China - and Itself, TIME, June 5, 1989, at 29.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Stewart, Fear and Anger in Hong Kong, TIME, June 19, 1989, at 22.
33. Greenwald, supra note 29, at 29.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Talbott, supra note 12, at 10.
37. Smolowe, supra note 17, at 32.
38. Stewart, supra note 32, at 22.
39. Greenwald, supra note 29, at 29.
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has found an identity at last, and it is Chinese."4 ° N,ow, Hong
Kong's confidence in China has been undermined by the massacre at
Tiananmen Square, and there is concern over a future under China's
control."'
One of the greatest concerns of Hong Kong citizens is whether
the guarantees contained within the Joint Declaration,42 which es-
tablishes the reunification of China and Hong Kong, will be honored.
The Joint Declaration provides for promulgation of a Basic Law43
for Hong Kong. The Basic Law is still being negotiated by the Basic
Law Drafting Committee (BLDC), 4 and will not be promulgated
until 1990."5 The DBL has been published" for comment and the
solicitation of opinions. It may be helpful to examine the Constitu-
tion of the People's Republic of China (PRC), in particular its provi-
sions protecting human and individual rights, interpreted in light of
the events in Tiananmen Square. The provisions of China's Constitu-
tion can be compared with similar provisions in the Joint Declaration
and DBL. It will then be possible to identify areas of the DBL which
Hong Kong's negotiators need to focus upon to ensure protection for
human and individual rights. 7
III. The History of Britain's Acquisition of Hong Kong
Great Britain acquired Hong Kong Island in 1842 through the
Treaty of Nanking.4 8 After China's defeat in the Opium Wars, it
ceded the Island of Hong Kong to Britain in perpetuity,49 as part of
the price paid for cessation of hostilities.5 0 After eighteen additional
years of conflict with Britain,5 China ceded additional territory to
Britain as the price of peace. The Kowloon peninsula 2 and nearby
Stonecutters Island 53 were ceded to Britain in perpetuity through the
40. Id.
41. Chua-Eoan, China: The Wrath of Deng, TIME, June 19, 1989, at 18.
42. See generally Joint Declaration, supra note 5.
43. See generally DRAFT BASIC LAW, supra note 8.
44. Lau, Structure of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, 20
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 51, 52 (1988).
45. Id.
46. Los Angeles Daily Journal, June 23, 1988, at 4, col. 1.
47. For the purpose of this Comment, it is necessary to assume that China will honor the
provisions of the Joint Declaration and Draft Basic Law. While it is acknowledged that there
is a possibility that the assumption is in error, that is a subject for another discussion and is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
48. Treaty of Nanking, August 29, 1842, China-Great Britain, 50 British and Foreign
State Papers 389, reprinted in 93 PARRY'S T.S. 465 (1979) [hereinafter Treaty of Nanking].
49. Id. at art. Ill.
50. Id. at para. 1.
51. Jackson, The Legal Regime of Hong Kong After 1997: An Examination of the Joint
Declaration of the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China, 5 INT'L TAX & Bus.
LAW. 379, 380 (1987).




Convention of Peking."' The Convention of 1898 leased the New
Territories5" to Britain for ninety-nine years.5 These areas together
are a whole, and constitute present-day Hong Kong.
China has, at least since the early 1960s, maintained that these
agreements are unequal treaties and are subject to renegotiation .5
China considers all treaties imposed upon it during the period of Eu-
ropean expansion and colonization "in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries . . . to be unequal treaties." '58 Although China
has never offered a definition of the term unequal treaties, 59 it does
suggest that there must be genuine equality between the parties;
equality depends upon "state character, economic strength, and the
substance of correlation of the contracting states."'60
The reunification agreement was the result of British negotia-
tions with China beginning in 1982. The need for negotiation at that
time was due in part to threatened economic disruption in Hong
Kong.6 Britain's ninety-nine year lease, acquired through the Con-
vention of 1898, technically applied to only the New Territories."
While the expiration of the lease in 1997 relates only to this portion
of present-day Hong Kong, the interdependence of the areas com-
prising the colony makes partition unlikely.63
In light of the approaching 1997 deadline, the Hong Kong busi-
ness community was concerned over the extension of current private
real estate leases, which typically run at least fifteen years.' Reluc-
tance to extend current leases thus led to the Britain-China negotia-
tions which culminated in the signing of the Joint Declaration in
1984.65
54. Convention of Peking, Oct. 24, 1860, China-Great Britain, art. VI, 50 British and
Foreign State Papers 10, reprinted in 123 PARRY'S T.S. 71 (1979).
55. See infra Appendix I.
56. Convention of 1898, June 9, 1898, China-Great Britain, para. I, 50 British and For-
eign State Papers 17, reprinted in 186 PARRY'S T.S. 310 (1979) [hereinafter 1898
Convention].
57. H. CHiu, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF TREATIES 97 (1972).
58. Id. at 63.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Corwin, China's Choices: The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and its After-
math, 19 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 505, 506-07 (1987).
62. 1898 Convention, supra note 50, at para. 1.
63. Jackson, supra note 51, at 380.
64. Corwin, supra note 61, at 507.
65. Id.
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IV. Comparison of the Constitution of the PRC, the Joint Declara-
tion, and the Draft Basic Law: Protection and Violation of Human
and Individual Rights
A. Human Rights as a Global Concept
Certain events or situations may be viewed differently by indi-
viduals of different cultural, ethnic, or religious backgrounds. Some
moral or cultural values vary widely. Religious intolerance, for ex-
ample, lies at the heart of the disturbances in Northern Ireland. In
South Africa, racial intolerance is codified in the system of
apartheid. The debate over abortion is a source of discord in the
United States. The appropriateness of capital punishment is a sub-
ject over which people differ, with some countries such as the United
States permitting execution and others, such as France, prohibiting
it.
There are other events such as genocide and homicide, which
are viewed almost universally as wrongs. A country's deliberate mas-
sacre of its own citizens is an act which would and, in the case of
Tiananmen Square, has received worldwide condemnation.
B. Examination of China's Constitution: Can Tiananmen Square
be Justified Under its Provisions?
Although China is attempting to rewrite the history of the
Tiananmen Square massacre,6 a reading of China's Constitution
reveals that its articles can be interpreted to permit the very events
which occurred. The State is given the power to maintain public or-
der and suppress "treasonable and other counterrevolutionary activi-
ties.""7 Using this power, the state can infringe upon the rights of
China's citizens. While the Constitution gives certain rights to citi-
zens, it also imposes certain duties upon them. 8 The duties required
of each citizen are the gateway to the state's limitation of individual
rights.
Citizens are given freedom of speech and demonstration, 9 pro-
vided that their use of these freedoms does not "infringe upon the
interests of the State, of society, ... or upon the lawful freedoms
and rights of other citizens. ' 70 The students in Tiananmen Square,
66. Smolowe, supra note 17, at 32.
67. "The state maintains public order and suppresses treasonable and other counter-
revolutionary activities; it penalizes actions that endanger public security and disrupt the so-
cialist economy and other criminal activities, and punishes and reforms criminals." Id. at ch. 1,
art. 28.
68. "Every citizen enjoys the rights and at the same time must perform the duties pre-
scribed by the constitution and the law." Id. at ch. 2, art. 33, para. 3.
69. "Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of
assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration." Id. at art. 35.
70. "The exercise by citizens of the People's Republic of China of their freedoms and
[Vol. 8:2
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therefore, were permitted to demonstrate so long as they did not in-
fringe upon the rights of other citizens, such as those who work in
public sanitation and maintenance or require access to or through
the square,7 or those who simply wish to use the square." While the
students were free to "criticize or make suggestions ' 73 regarding the
government, these criticisms must be "relevant," '74 and must not be a
fabrication or distortion. The citizens of China have a duty to "safe-
guard the unity of the country,"75 to "abide by the Constitution and
the law, keep state secrets, and protect public property, 76 and a
duty to not "commit acts detrimental to the security [of China] .77
While this theoretical exercise finds potential justification for
the Tiananmen massacre in the Constitution of the PRC, China has
not attempted to justify its actions in this manner. China has neither
explained nor attempted to justify the Tiananmen Square massacre;
instead it has attempted to rewrite the history of that event.7
1. Application of the PRC Constitution to the Arrests and
Executions Following Tiananmen Square.-In justifying the pur-
suit, arrest and, in some cases, execution of participants in the stu-
dent uprising, official explanations have labeled the participants as
counterrevolutionaries. 79 The government of China has televised pic-
tures of the participants, calling them the country's most wanted
criminals.8" China has exhorted patriotic citizens to turn in these
rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society and of the collective, or upon
the lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens." Id. at art. 51.
71. "Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right as well as the duty to
work." Id. at ch. 2, art. 42, para. 1; "Disturbance of the orderly functioning of the social
economy or disruption of the state economic plan by any organization or individual is prohib-
ited." Id. at ch. 1, art. 15, para. 2.
72. "Socialist public property is sacred and inviolable. The state protects socialist public
property . . . . Appropriation or damage of state or collective property by any organization or
individual by whatever means is prohibited." Id. at art. 12; "The state protects places of ethnic
and historical interest, valuable cultural monuments and relics and other important items of
China's historical and cultural heritage." Id. at art. 22, para. 2.
73. "Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right to criticize and make
suggestions to any state organ or functionary. Citizens have the right to make relevant com-
plaints and charges against, or exposure of, violation of the law or dereliction of duty by any
state organ or functionary; but fabrication or distortion of facts with the intention of libel or
frame-up is prohibited." Id. at ch. 2, art. 41, para. 1.
74. Id.
75. "It is the duty of citizens of the People's Republic of China to safeguard the unity of
the country and the unity of all its nationalities." Id. at art. 52.
76. "Citizens of the People's Republic of China must abide by the constitution and the
law, keep state secrets, protect public property and observe labour discipline and public order
and respect social ethics." Id. at art. 53.
77. "It is the duty of citizens of the People's Republic of China to safeguard the secur-
ity, honour and interests of the motherland, they must not commit acts detrimental to the
security, honour, and interests of the motherland." Id. at art. 54.
78. Smolowe, supra note 17, at 32.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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"criminals,"81 terming them counterrevolutionaries and hooligans.82
Those who have been arrested have been paraded on television where
they publicly "confessed" that they were counterrevolutionaries. 3
Some have been arrested and charged with rumormongering or
treason.8 "
Many of these offenses carry the death penalty, 5 and can be
effectively used by China's government to remove those remaining
participants who are seen as leaders of the opposition. China has also
attempted to silence the press." Chinese television, which had been
accurately broadcasting the events at Tiananmen Square, began in-
stead to broadcast only praise of the military, arrest of the partici-
pants, and exhortation to the citizenry to turn in the wanted
criminals.8 7 Foreign journalists are not exempt from China's at-
tempts to halt any discussion of the true story of Tiananmen Square.
A Western journalist was charged with "distorting facts"88 and
"stirring turmoil,"8 9 and was given seventy-two hours to leave the
country.
Can events such as these be prevented from occurring in Hong
Kong? With time still available before promulgation of the DBL,
Hong Kong may be able to negotiate for provisions in the law which
will minimize this possibility.
C. Joint Declaration
1. Provisions of the Joint Declaration Which are of Special
Concern with Respect to Protection of Human and Individual
Rights.-The Joint Declaration and its Annexes, hereinafter jointly
referred to as the Joint Declaration, which provide for transfer of
sovereignty over Hong Kong, state that China will establish Hong
Kong as a Special Administrative Region90 under article 31 of the
Constitution of the PRC, which authorizes the creation of special
administrative regions when necessary.9' The Joint Declaration





85. Scobell, Strung Up or Shot Down? The Death Penalty in Hong Kong and China and
Implications for Post-1997, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 147, 148-49 (1988).




90. Joint Declaration, supra note 5, at sec. 3(1).
91. "The state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems
to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the
National People's Congress in light of the specific conditions." PRC CONST., at ch. 1, art. 31.
The Constitution does not identify the meaning of "specific conditions."
[Vol. 8:2
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cept in foreign and defense affairs, and that the current social and
economic systems, as well as the life style will remain unchanged.92
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) will be
vested with executive, legislative, and independent judicial power.93
The Government of the HKSAR will be composed of local inhabi-
tants,9 4 and the Chief Executive will be appointed by the Central
People's Government of China. 5 The Joint Declaration does not
specify the exact process by which the chief executive will be chosen,
but mentions consultations or elections.9"
The declaration provides that maintenance of public order will
be the responsibility of the HKSAR.97 However, the PRC will main-
tain military forces in the HKSAR "for the purpose of defence;" 9 8
these forces will not interfere in the internal affairs of the HKSAR.99
Annex I of the Joint Declaration also provides that the "provisions of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights," '10
to which China is not a signatory, 101 "as applied to Hong Kong shall
remain in force.
1 0 2
The policies named in the Joint Declaration will be stipulated in
a Basic Law of the HKSAR, and will remain unchanged for fifty
years.10 3 The National People's Congress, a governing body of the
PRC, will enact and promulgate the Basic Law in accordance with
the Constitution of the PRC.10 4 Annex I of the Joint Declaration
provides that the socialist system and policies will not be practiced in
the HKSAR,'1 5 and that the laws previously in force in Hong Kong
will be maintained except where they contradict the Basic Law.1 6
2. Ambiguities and Omissions in the Joint Declaration Which
Should Be Specifically Addressed in the Basic Law to Ensure Pro-
tection of Human and Individual Rights.-One issue which remains
unresolved is whether the entire Constitution of the PRC becomes
92. Joint Declaration, supra note 5, at sec. 3(2).
93. Id. at sec. 3(3).
94. Id. at sec. 3(4).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at sec. 3(11).
98. Id. at Annex 1, sec. XII, para. 1.
99. Id.
100. Id. at sec. XIII, para. 4; see also International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter International Covenants].
101. Jackson, supra note 51, at 415.
102. Joint Declaration, supra note 5, at Annex I, sec. XIII, para. 4.
103. Id. at sec. 3(12).
104. Id. at Annex I, sec. I, para. 1.
105. Id.
106. Id. at Annex I, sec. I1, para. 1.
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applicable to any special administrative region created under article
31. While it could be so interpreted, it can also be argued that any
special administrative region created in compliance with article 31
would also be in compliance with the Constitution. 7 One commen-
tator suggests that the Constitution of the PRC be amended or re-
vised to stipulate that special administrative regions would not be
bound by certain provisions of the Constitution of the PRC.0 s
China's leadership may be resistant to an attempt to amend the
PRC Constitution. An attempt to incorporate the same concept into
the DBL may be more acceptable and more likely to succeed.
Article 31 provides authority for the National People's Congress
to enact laws for the special administrative regions "in light of the
specified conditions."1 9 A statement should be negotiated and incor-
porated into the Basic Law to the effect that the Basic Law is
promulgated under the authority of article 31, and that article 31 is
the only article of the PRC Constitution applicable to the HKSAR.
Since the events in Tiananmen Square, it is all too clear that some
articles of the PRC Constitution can be used, in effect, to eliminate
human and individual rights contained within other articles of that
Constitution. While a provision in the Basic Law limiting application
of the PRC Constitution to article 31 will not necessarily protect
Hong Kong from an administration intent upon circumventing the
spirit and letter of the Joint Agreement, the absence of any such
provision makes it much easier for China to do so.
The Joint Declaration provides that the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Ec-
onomic, Social and Cultural Rights "as applied to Hong Kong shall
remain in force."' 110 China is not a signatory to either document,"'
and is not, therefore, bound by their terms under international law.
To increase the specificity of the Basic Law and decrease the oppor-
tunity for selective interpretation, specific provisions of the Cove-
nants, which protect human and individual rights, should be incorpo-
rated into the Basic Law. It would also be wise to attempt to
negotiate for a provision similar to Part Two, article 5 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," 2 which prohibits
107. For an excellent discussion of the question see Cheng, The Constitutional Relation-
ship Between the Central Government and the Future Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion Government, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 65, 70 (1988).
108. Id.
109. PRC CONST., at ch. 1, art. 31.
110. Joint Declaration, supra note 5, at Annex I, sec. XIII, para. 4.
Ill. Jackson, supra note 51, at 415.
112. "Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State,
group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruc-
tion of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater
extent than is provided for in the present Covenant." International Covenants, supra note 101,
at Part II, art. 5.
[Vol. 8:2
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interpretation of provisions in a manner which would destroy or limit
the rights and freedoms contained in the document.
. On the surface it would appear that China would be reluctant
to include specific, carefully worded provisions which would restrict
its opportunities to increase its control over, or presence in, the HK-
SAR. It must be remembered, however, that in light of world con-
demnation of the Tiananmen Square incident, it would be to China's
advantage to accommodate the fears and uncertainties of the citizens
of Hong Kong as well as the concerns of those who have business
interests there. Failure to do so could result in further delays in pro-
mulgation of the Basic Law and in delayed investment in Hong
Kong, or in a wholesale retreat of those who have current business
interests there.
D. Draft Basic Laws
1. Negotiation and Publication of the Draft Basic Law.-The
effort to draft the Basic Law began in 1985.13 The BLDC was es-
tablished" 4 to draft a Basic Law which would incorporate the princi-
ples contained in the Joint Declaration.' 5 The Basic Law will estab-
lish and define the governmental structure of the HKSAR," 6 and
the relationship between the HKSAR and the PRC.1
7
The BLDC "consist[s] of 40 Chinese members appointed by the
PRC government and 23 Hong Kong members selected by the initial
40 Chinese members.""' 8 The ratio of Chinese and Hong Kong
members makes it likely that PRC views will prevail. In response,
the Hong Kong public insisted that they be allowed to participate in
the drafting of the Basic Law; 9 as a result, 180 residents were se-
lected in 1985 from a cross-section of the community to form a Con-
sultative Committee. 20 The Committee is to act as liaison between
the Hong Kong community and the BLDC' 21 "so that public con-
cern and aspiration will be reflected in the Basic Law."' 22
While it appears that the PRC acted to include Hong Kong in
the process of determining its future government, it must be noted
that the Consultative Committee is advisory and that ultimately the
content of the Basic Law must satisfy the PRC. The Basic Law is to
113. Lau, supra note 44, at 51.
114. Jackson, supra note 51, at 379.
115, Joint Declaration, supra note 5, at art. 3(12).
116. See generally Joint Declaration, supra note 5.
117, Id.
118, Jackson, supra note 51, at 382-83.
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be enacted and promulgated by the PRC2 3 "in accordance with the
Constitution of the People's Republic of China." '124
Between 1985 and the publication of the DBL, viewpoints were
"bitterly divided within the . . . BLDC as well as within the Hong
Kong community. The biggest contention concerned selections of the
chief executive . . . and members of the legislature .... 125 Many
within the Hong Kong community did not believe that China would
honor the promises it had made,126 or believed that China would
honor "most of the promises made in the Joint Declaration, . . . but
[would] retain full control over the political sphere. ' 127 Those con-
cerns were, no doubt, heightened by remarks made by Deng Xiaop-
ing 128 during an April 1987 meeting with BLDC members at the
fourth BLDC plenary session in Beijing.12 9 There, Deng indicated
that the Basic Law should not borrow wholesale from the West and
should not be too detailed. 3 ' Deng also declared that the separation
of powers concept was not suitable for the future government of
Hong Kong because Hong Kong was not to be a country.13'
Although the Joint Declaration promised an independent judici-
ary,'13 2 Deng's statement that there should be no separation-of-pow-
ers undermines that promise. The Joint Declaration stipulates that
China will appoint the chief executive of the HKSAR, 133 and that
the chief executive will appoint judges134 in accordance with recom-
mendations made by an independent commission.135 With the selec-
tion of judges ultimately under the control of the PRC, and without
separation-of-powers within the government of the HKSAR, the
functioning of the judiciary will be under China's control as well.
The promise of an independent judiciary is form without substance.
Two years after the work of the BLDC began, the DBL was
published in April 1988136 for comment by the residents of Hong
Kong. 37 A thorough reading of the DBL reveals that the fears of the
Hong Kong community may be valid, and that "vague principles
contained in the Joint Declaration could be subject to wide-ranging
123. Joint Declaration, supra note 5, at Annex I, art. I, para. 1.
124. Id.
125. Lau, supra note 44, at 51.
126. Id.
127. Id.




132. Joint Declaration, supra note 5, at Annex 1, sec. III, para. 2.
133. Id. at art. 3(4).
134. Id. at Annex 1, sec. III, para. 3.
135. Id.




interpretations. 8 Many of the provisions of the DBL were inconsis-
tent with the spirit and wording of the Joint Declaration. On the
surface, these suspect provisions echo the wording of the Joint Decla-
ration, but are either modified by other provisions or are candidates
for recharacterization should the Government of China so choose.
2. Appointment and Duties of the Chief Executive: Potential
Trouble Spots for Protection of Human and Individual
Rights.-The Chief Executive of the HKSAR will be appointed by
China,'139 and will be selected either through election or consulta-
tion.1 40 He or she must be a Chinese national,"4 at least forty years
old, ' 4 2 and must have resided in Hong Kong for twenty years. 14 The
BLDC has currently proposed five alternative methods" 4 for selec-
tion of the Chief Executive. No matter which method is finally
adopted, the candidate will have to be acceptable to China since the
PRC retains the power of appointment.
The Chief Executive is to be assisted in policy-making by the
Executive Council,14 5 a group which he or she selects, then ap-
points, 46 and over which he or she presides."17 The Chief Executive
retains the power to remove any members of the Executive Coun-
cil,' 48 and is expected to consult with the Executive Council before
making important decisions, 149 but is not bound to follow its opinion
so long as the reason for not doing so is stated on the record.'5 0
The Chief Executive may nominate for appointment the Secre-
taries and Deputy Secretaries of Departments.' 5' China also retains
the power to appoint 52 these officials. The Chief Executive and the
heads of Departments constitute the Executive Authorities,' 3 and
the Executive Authorities, in turn, constitute the Government of the
HKSAR.15 4 This arrangement of power is of concern because of the
potential use of China's military presence in Hong Kong. The mili-
tary forces sent by China are for the defense of the HKSAR 5 and
138. Lau, supra note 44, at 52.
139. DRAFT BASIC LAW, supra note 8, at ch. I1, art. 14.
140. Id. at ch. IV, sec. 1, art. 45.
141. Id. at art. 44.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at Annex I.
145. Id. at art. 54.
146. Id. at art. 55, para. 1.
147. Id. at art. 56, para. 1.
148. Id. at art. 55, para. 1.
149. Id. at art. 56, para. 2.
150. Id. at para. 3.
151. Id. at sec. 1, art. 48(5).
152. Id.
153. Id. at sec. 2, art. 60.
154. Id. at art. 59.
155, Id. at ch. I, art. 13, para. 2.
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may not interfere in local affairs."' Article 1 3,157 however, gives the
government of the HKSAR the power to ask the PRC for the assis-
tance of the military stationed in the HKSAR to maintain public
order.
The power of the Chief Executive and Department heads to
summon China's military does not require approval or input from
the Legislative Council (legislature). The Chief Executive is excused
from consultation with his Executive Council in event of emer-
gency, 158 which further reduces the number of individuals involved in
the decision to use China's military. While such authority may be
useful and necessary in the event of natural disasters, such as earth-
quakes or typhoons, it is not limited to such events by the terms of
article 13.'9 China has thus retained the power to appoint a govern-
ment that can summon China's military to intervene upon any occa-
sion which it determines a threat to public order. With a Govern-
ment appointed by China, the risk exists that the military will also
be called out if China deems it necessary. Tiananmen Square was
such an occasion, and China called out its military in response. The
DBL opens the door for the government of the HKSAR to act in the
same manner. The Hong Kong members of the BLDC should at-
tempt to negotiate for incorporation of language which will limit or
specify the instances in which military assistance may be requested.
3. Election and Duties of the Legislature: Further Areas for
Potential Compromise of Human and Individual Rights.-The first
legislature of the HKSAR will be elected for a two-year term.'6 0 The
mechanism for election of members of the first legislature is some-
what convoluted. The Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress of the PRC will select a Preparatory Committee,"6 ' whose
membership will consist of no less than fifty percent Hong Kong
members, with the remaining members from mainland China.162 The
Preparatory Committee will establish an Election Committee com-
posed entirely of permanent residents of Hong Kong. 163 The Election
Committee will, in turn, select and elect the first legislature of the
HKSAR.'
64
With China selecting all the members of the Preparatory Com-
mittee, it will no doubt select members sympathetic to its ideology
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at ch. IV, sec. 1, art. 56, para. 2.
159. Id.
160. Id. at Annex III, art. 5.
161. Id. at art. 1.
162. Id.




and responsive to its wishes. The Preparatory Committee will likely
do as China wishes in its selection of the Election Committee, and
the Election Committee will be electing the entire first legislature.
While this election process honors the letter of the Joint Declara-
tion's"5I promise of an elected legislature, only a minute proportion
of Hong Kong citizens will have any direct participation in this puta-
tive election.
The DBL gives China a number of other controls over the en-
actment and amendment of laws;16 the additional control of selec-
tion of the legislating body can, in effect, give China the power to
rewrite the existing law during the first legislature's two-year term.
While the Joint Declaration" 7 promises that the law will remain un-
changed, it also provides that the laws are subject to amendment by
the HKSAR legislature.' 68 Article 8169 of the DBL echoes the prom-
ise, and its caveat. The power to amend the Basic Law, however,
remains with China. 70 The Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress' and the State Council 72 have the right to pro-
pose amendments to the Basic Law. 173 The HKSAR may propose
amendments by submitting them to the National People's Con-
gress174 after obtaining the consent of two-thirds of the HKSAR's
representatives to the National People's Congress,' 75 two-thirds of
the members of the legislature,' 76 and the Chief Executive.177
While the power to change the law is necessary to permit law to
evolve, it carries a risk of abuse. There is no provision for any ratifi-
cation of amendments by the general population of Hong Kong. The
power of amendment coupled with China's potential ability to ensure
that the first legislature will be sympathetic and responsive to
China's views, could result in eradication of the human and individ-
ual rights protections incorporated into the Joint Declaration and the
DBL.
Alternative methods of election of the first legislature have al-
ready been proposed. 178 The Hong Kong representatives on the
BLDC may be able to use the incident at Tiananmen Square to ob-
165. Joint Declaration, supra note 5, at Annex I, sec. I, para. 3.
166. See generally DRAFT BASIC LAW, supra note 8, at ch. IV.
167. Joint Declaration, supra note 5, at Annex 1, sec. II, para. 1.
168. Id.
169. DRAFT BASIC LAW, supra note 8, at ch. 1, art. 8.
170. Id. at ch. IX, art. 170, para. 1.







178. Id. at Appendix ii.
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tain an election process which includes direct voting by the popula-
tion of Hong Kong, and removes China's pervasive influence in the
selection and election of the first legislature.
The DBL specifies that subsequent legislatures will be consti-
tuted by a combination of direct and indirect election. 179 Four alter-
native methods are included in the DBL.180 The portion of the legis-
lature to be elected through direct elections ranges from twenty-five
percent 81 to fifty percent.1 82 In order to obtain a legislature respon-
sive to the needs and rights of the population of Hong Kong, it is
imperative that the general population be ensured greater participa-
tion in election of their representatives. Tiananmen Square may pro-
vide the leverage necessary to acquire a more favorable election
process.
4. Provisions of the Draft Basic Law Which Threaten the In-
tegrity of the Legislature, and of the Office of Chief Execu-
tive.-Articles 67183 and 45184 provide that the methods for selecting
the legislature and chief executive, respectively, are subject to modi-
fication in light of the situation in the HKSAR. Modification re-
quires the approval of two-thirds of the legislature, 185 consent of the
Chief Executive,' 86 and approval of the National People's Congress
of China.18 7 Given China's influence in the election of the first legis-
lature,18 and power of appointment of the Chief Executive'89 of the
HKSAR, China may be able to mastermind alteration of the elec-
tion process. This could occur even where Hong Kong members of
the BLDC are able to negotiate and ultimately promulgate an elec-
tion process which includes direct election. Any laws protecting indi-
vidual and human rights would be held hostage to the political
machinations occurring in China, given China's control or influence
over the executive and legislative branches of the HKSAR.
The offending provisions of articles 67190 and 45191 should either
be eliminated or criteria which specify when modification of the elec-
tion processes can occur should be incorporated. The Hong Kong
members may now have the ability to effect these changes. The fears
179. Id. at ch. IV, sec. 3, art. 67.
180. Id. at Annex II.
181. Id. at Alternative I(1); Alternative 4(1).
182. Id. at Alternative 2(1).
183. Id. at ch. IV, sec. 3, art. 67, para. 3.
184. Id. at sec. 1, art. 45, para. 3.
185. Id. at sec. 3, art. 67, para. 3; ch. IV, sec. 1, art. 45, para. 3.
186. Id.; see also id. at sec. 1, art. 45, para. 3.
187. Id.
188. See generally id at Annex 11I.
189. Id. at ch. I!, art. 14.
190. Id. at ch. IV, sec. 3, art. 67, para. 3.
191. Id. at sec. I, art. 45, para. 3.
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in Hong Kong, raised by Tiananmen Square and by China's re-
sponse to the incident, may make China more amenable to changing
the DBL rather than risk economic disruption and an exodus of busi-
ness investments.
The Chief Executive, after consultation with the Executive
Council192 may, under certain circumstances, dissolve the legisla-
ture.'93 The Chief Executive is not required to heed the opinion of
the Executive Council, 194 but must state, on the record, the reason
for not doing SO.19 5 The legislature does not have the power to intro-
duce bills.196 The DBL draws a distinction between bills, which must
be introduced by the Executive Authorities,'97 and laws which may
be enacted and amended by the legislature.'98 The legislature's fail-
ure to pass bills which the Chief Executive deems important is one
circumstance which can trigger its dissolution.' 99 While the Chief
Executive may only dissolve the legislature once during each term in
office,'00 once would be sufficient where the legislature refused to
pass a bill limiting the rights of the citizens of Hong Kong.
5. The Independent Judiciary: Fact or Fiction?-The DBL
promises an independent judiciary with the power of final adjudica-
tion.2"' The exercise of judicial power is to be free from any interfer-
ence.202 What the DBL grants it also may eliminate, for the power
to interpret the law of the HKSAR is vested in the Standing Com-
mittee of the National People's Congress of the PRC.203 When the
Standing Committee makes an interpretation of the Basic Law, the
courts of the HKSAR must follow the interpretation of the Standing
Committee.0 4 The courts of the HKSAR have no jurisdiction over
matters related to defense or foreign affairs,20 5 or over other af-
fairs206 which are the responsibility of the PRC. If a case involves
192. Id. at art. 56, para. 2.
193. Id. at art. 50.
194. Id. at art. 56, para. 3.
195. Id.
196. Id. at sec. 3, art. 62. The power to introduce bills belongs to the Executive Authori-
ties. Id. at ch. IV, sec. 2, art. 62(5). This group consists of the Chief Executive and Depart-
ment heads, who are nominated by the Chief Executive, and appointed by China. See id. at
sec. I, art. 48(5), sec. 2 arts. 59-62.
197. Id. at sec. 2, art. 62(5).
198. Id. at sec. 3, art. 72(l). The distinction is not expressly defined but is inherent in
the terminology of the power granted to the legislature in Article 72, and to the Executive
Authorities in Article 62.
199. Id. at art. 50, para. 1.
200. Id. at para. 2.
201. Id. at ch. I, art. 2; ch. IV, sec. 4, art. 81.
202. Id. at ch. IV, sec. 4, art. 84.
203. Id. at ch. IX, art. 169, para. I.
204. Id. at para. 2.
205. Id. at ch. I, art. 18, para. 3.
206. Id. Article 169 does not specify what affairs are the other affairs which are the
responsibility of the PRC.
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interpretation of provisions of the DBL relating to these matters, the
court is to seek an interpretation of the provision from the Standing
Committee of the PRC.20 7
The promise of an independent judiciary is an empty one. The
right of interpretation of the DBL is reserved to the PRC, and the
court becomes little more than a rubber stamp for the direct deci-
sions of China. China is free to interpret all provisions of the DBL in
any manner it chooses, and may eliminate rights by recharacterizing
and selectively interpreting the articles of the DBL. A court can do
little but apply what China says is the law to the facts of the case
before it. The promise of final adjudication gives Hong Kong little
when China retains the power to interpret the law. China may also
remove jurisdiction by characterizing a matter as one related to de-
fense, foreign affairs, or to other affairs which are the responsibility
of China.
Hong Kong's control over its own judiciary is only an appear-
ance of control. While it is possible that China may be willing to
negotiate changes in an effort to ease Hong Kong's fears in the wake
of Tiananmen Square, it is more likely that China will wish to retain
control over the judiciary. The power to interpret the Basic Law is
one of the strongest and most direct mechanisms for control of Hong
Kong's population. While China has the power to appoint or influ-
ence the appointment of executive and legislative officials, its control
over these officials is less direct.
6. Protection of Specific Individual Rights Under the Draft
Basic Law: Enough is Never Enough.-Hong Kong's current law re-
tains the death penalty for three offenses,208 although no executions
have been carried out since 1966.209 The Governor of Hong Kong
generally commutes all death sentences. 10 This practice of commu-
tation began shortly after the death penalty for murder was abol-
ished in the United Kingdom."'
In China, however, forty-four distinct crimes are capital of-
fenses,2" ' including "counter-revolutionary crimes" '213 such as plot-
ting to subvert the government,2"" and "crimes endangering public
security ' 21 5 such as hooliganism. 1 ' China carries out the death pen-
207. Id.
208. Scobell, supra note 86, at 148. Murder, treason, and piracy with violence carry a
possible sentence of death by hanging. Id. at 147.
209. Id. at 155.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 150.
213. Id. at 151.
214. Id. (quoting the CRIMINAL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 92).




alty, and Western diplomats estimate that as many as 10,000 execu-
tions are carried out each year.2"7 Amnesty International reports
that China is using both public and secret executions as a political
tool 218 in the wake of Tiananmen Square. A directive, Document
No. 3,219 approved by the Communist Party's Central Committee,
called for the execution of counterrevolutionaries,22 ° the concealment
of the precise number of individuals executed or imprisoned, 2 1 and
the publication of certain death sentences in order to "make
examples. 222
Reports such as these raise fear for the future of Hong Kong.
China's power of interpretation of the Basic Law, and potential con-
trol over the executive and legislative processes could mean that the
number of capital offenses will increase, and that executions will
again be carried out in the HKSAR. The wording of the DBL does
not preclude the possibility that China may be able to use execution
as a political tool in Hong Kong. For example, article 22223 requires
the HKSAR to "prohibit by law any act designed to undermine na-
tional unity or subvert the Central People's Government [of
China]."'24 China's power to interpret the DBL gives it the ability to
define article 22225 to include any type of conduct which China
wishes to forbid, and to punish that conduct by execution.
The. DBL guarantees that Hong Kong residents will have free-
dom of speech, press, publication, association, assembly, and demon-
stration. 26 China is free to limit these rights through the use of arti-
cle 22's227 prohibition of acts designed to undermine national unity
or subvert the government, in conjunction with China's power to in-
terpret the Basic Law under article 169,228 and its power to amend
the Basic Law under article 170.229 Using these powers in conjunc-
tion with article 39230 which provides that rights and freedom shall
not be restricted "unless prescribed by law, ' 23 1 China has wide lati-
tude to restrict rights without violating the letter of the Joint Decla-
ration or the Basic Law. While article 39232 specifies that restrictions
217. Id. at 161.
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on rights and freedoms may not go beyond that necessary to main-
tain "national security, public order, public safety, public health,
public morals and for the safeguarding of the rights and freedoms of
others, ' 233 there is little that could not be fit into at least one of
those categories.
The DBL,23 4 on its face, purports to guarantee a number of
other rights and freedoms, including: freedom of person,2 35 inviola-
bility of an individual's home,236 freedom and privacy of communica-
tion, 3 7 and freedom of academic research, literary and artistic crea-
tion, and other cultural pursuits.238 Each of these rights and
freedoms could be subject to the same type of manipulation and
limitation.
China's power to interpret239 and amend the Basic Law, 240 cou-
pled with a prohibition of "any act ' 241 designed to undermine or
subvert the government, gives China a potent arsenal with which it
may sabotage the individual rights and freedoms of the citizens of
the HKSAR. These powers, in conjunction with China's role in the
selection of the Chief Executive and Executive Authorities give
China awesome power to eradicate the intent of the Joint Declara-
tion. China has the means to effect any changes it desires; it remains
to be seen whether China will do so.
IV. Conclusion
China's political structure is undergoing some reorganization,
with a consolidation of power by its hard-line political leaders.2"2
Deng Xiaoping's support of the hard-line faction headed by Premier
Li Peng,243 and joined by President Yang Shangkun244 set the stage
for the massacre at Tiananmen Square. On November 10, 1989,
Deng Xiaoping resigned his last government position2 45 as Chairman
of the Central Military Commission. The Central Committee ac-
cepted Deng's resignation, and at the same meeting, made changes
in the military commission which will increase the power of Presi-
dent Yang Shangkun.246 While Deng is expected to remain a power-
233. Id.
234. See generally id. at ch. II1.
235. Id. at art. 27.
236. Id. at art. 28.
237. Id. at art. 29.
238. Id. at art. 33.
239. Id. at ch. IX, art. 169, para. I.
240. Id. at art. 170, para. I.
241. Id. at ch. I1, art. 22.
242. Elson, supra note 2, at 20.
243. Id.
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ful force in Chinese politics," 7 his resignation and the ensuing re-
shuffling has served to consolidate power in the hard-line faction.
Hong Kong could have much to fear from this consolidation of
power. The hard-line faction was the mastermind of Tiananmen
Square,248 and of the current policy of public and secret executions
of counterrevolutionaries." 9
There are factors which weigh against any attempt to curtail
the rights and freedoms promised by the Joint Declaration and DBL.
Among these factors are the amount of attention focused upon
China since Tiananmen Square, the threat of economic disruption in
the Hong Kong economy, and China's desire for reunification2 50 with
Taiwan.
World opinion may not be a particularly important factor, for
world attention was focused upon China during the demonstrations
which preceded Tiananmen Square, yet that scrutiny did not prevent
a massacre. Perhaps in the balance, threat of worldwide disapproval
was outweighed by the fear of widespread political upheaval which
could have resulted if a population the size of China's discovered
that demonstration could effect change.
China is in the process of effecting an economic austerity pro-
gram.2 51 A stable and prosperous Hong Kong will not only en-
courage business interests within Hong Kong, but can lead to in-
creased investment in a China which keeps its promises. Businesses
will be less reluctant to make long-term investments if they see that
promises are honored. The reverse would harm both Hong Kong and
China, for businesses would retreat from the present investments in
Hong Kong, and would be reluctant to invest in China despite its
large labor pool and favorable wages. China's current economic
problems may actually serve to ensure the protection of individual
rights and freedoms in Hong Kong.
Taiwan has been the site of the Nationalist Government2 52 since
the 1949 Communist uprising and Mao Zedong's accession to power.
Taiwan has long been a target of Deng Xiaoping 'IS53 efforts to re-
unify China. While Hong Kong is a British Crown Colony, subject
to the control of Great Britain, Taiwan is essentially independent. If
China wishes reunification with Taiwan it must use care in its treat-
ment of Hong Kong. Taiwan may share China's racial and ethnic
heritage, but Taiwan does not share China's political philosophy and
247. Id.
248. Elson, supra note 2, at 20.
249. Amnesty International, supra note 24, at 4.
250. Jackson, supra note 51, at 422.
251. N.Y. Times, supra note 239, at A12, col. 3.
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is unlikely to willingly reassociate with China if Hong Kong is
treated poorly. If China's interest in reunification is greater than its
need for political domination of Hong Kong, then China will be less
likely to interfere in Hong Kong.
China's actions toward Hong Kong are not reliably predictable
at the present time. Deng Xiaoping's advanced age, and the recent
political reshuffling in China make it difficult to predict the path that
China will take. The important factors weighing against interference
with Hong Kong include China's desire for reunification with Tai-
wan, and the economic disruption which could result from such in-
terference. World opinion plays some part, but in view of the
Tiananmen Square massacre, world opinion is probably only signifi-
cant as it impacts upon economic activity and reunification efforts
with Taiwan. Meanwhile, the citizens of Hong Kong are held hos-
tage to time, for only time will give the answer.
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